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ABSTRACT
The art of finding software vulnerabilities has been covered
extensively in the literature and there is a huge body of work
on this topic. In contrast, the intentional insertion of ex-
ploitable, security-critical bugs has received little (public)
attention yet. Wanting more bugs seems to be counterpro-
ductive at first sight, but the comprehensive evaluation of
bug-finding techniques suffers from a lack of ground truth
and the scarcity of bugs.
In this paper, we propose EvilCoder, a system to auto-
matically find potentially vulnerable source code locations
and modify the source code to be actually vulnerable. More
specifically, we leverage automated program analysis tech-
niques to find sensitive sinks which match typical bug pat-
terns (e.g., a sensitive API function with a preceding san-
ity check), and try to find data-flow connections to user-
controlled sources. We then transform the source code such
that exploitation becomes possible, for example by remov-
ing or modifying input sanitization or other types of security
checks. Our tool is designed to randomly pick vulnerable lo-
cations and possible modifications, such that it can generate
numerous different vulnerabilities on the same software cor-
pus. We evaluated our tool on several open-source projects
such as for example libpng and vsftpd, where we found
between 22 and 158 unique connected source-sink pairs per
project. This translates to hundreds of potentially vulner-
able data-flow paths and hundreds of bugs we can insert.
We hope to support future bug-finding techniques by sup-
plying freshly generated, bug-ridden test corpora so that
such techniques can (finally) be evaluated and compared in
a comprehensive and statistically meaningful way.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many different kinds of software vulnerabilities exist, rang-
ing from simple buffer overflows [1] over integer overflows [8]
to temporal errors [3] or even errors introduced by the com-
piler due to undefined behavior [35]. Numerous approaches
exist for finding such vulnerabilities and there is a huge body
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of work on this topic. Such techniques are based on an anal-
ysis of the source code (e.g., [15, 22,36]) or based on binary
analysis (e.g., [24, 34]), while others leverage fuzz testing
(e.g., [10,12,25]) or other techniques (e.g., [6, 33]).
We think that evaluating different approaches for finding
vulnerabilities is a hard problem in practice for two main
reasons: first, security vulnerabilities are scarce. That is not
to say that there are not too many of them, but for a sta-
tistically meaningful evaluation, they are simply spread too
thin and do not expose all facets of the underlying problem.
The second reason stems from the current practice to regard
finding new vulnerabilities as the most convincing argument
for a newly proposed technique. While this is the sole rea-
son as to why we develop such techniques, we argue that it
should not be how we evaluate bug-finding techniques.
In this work, we thus focus on the opposite problem: in-
stead of finding or fixing vulnerabilities, we study the inser-
tion of security-critical bugs in complex software systems.
Compared to the volume of source code or binary code, vul-
nerabilities are relatively rare and tend to be fixed once they
are found, which makes statistical evaluation complicated at
best. Having public bug-ridden test corpora with known bug
locations would help immensely to evaluate different tech-
niques in an objective manner. For example, the field of
machine-learning proceeds like this for years, having a few
standard corpora (like the Texas Instruments-MIT speech
corpus [11] or the Wall Street Journal corpus [32]), which
are widely used to compare new methods. We are con-
vinced that having freshly generated test corpora is crucial
for bug-finding techniques, as it prohibits memorizing the
bug database and forces any approach to abstract from the
details of the individual bugs. This may be one of the rea-
sons why the available static test corpora (e.g., [20, 30, 31])
are so seldom used in evaluating new techniques. Note that
by generating the bugs, one achieves ground truth for the
test corpus, as the full vulnerable path is known. Further-
more, such inserted bugs form a lower bound for the number
of bugs every bug-finding approach has to find. This can be
understood in two ways: First, the approach could obvi-
ously find more bugs in the test corpus, as the program may
have had vulnerabilities to begin with. Second, as these
ground-truth bugs are generated in an automatic way, they
are especially important to find, given that they could the-
oretically be inserted by any attacker without much effort.
Having the ability to check for places where a certain bug-
class might instantiate could also be used to assess two very
important data points: First, the number of places where it
could occur in the wild, which immediately gives a hint on
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the exoticness of that class. Second, an estimation of the
ratio of how often it could occur and how often it does oc-
cur. This in turn could help to prioritize aid for developers
to prevent those mistakes that are made very often.
Our approach of automatically inserting exploitable soft-
ware vulnerabilities in the source code of a given application
works as follows. In a first step, we analyze the source code
in order to find sensitive sinks, which match our supported
bug patterns, and try to find data-flow connections stem-
ming from user-controlled sources. Then, we trace the con-
trol flow between each source and sink connected by the data
flow, which effectively points us to locations which might
hinder exploitation (e. g., input sanitization routines or secu-
rity checks). If our analysis indicates that we indeed found
a potential location for a vulnerability, we transform the
source code such that exploitation becomes possible. Usu-
ally, there is more than one such location and the trans-
formation can happen in more than one way. Hence, we
can randomly choose a variant, which leads to a large set
of possible bugs. Note that we will often use the word bug
when referring to a vulnerability, although, one vulnerabil-
ity may necessitate the insertion of multiple bugs and, in
general, not every bug is security critical. Nevertheless, the
bugs we introduce are meant to be exploitable. However,
as the automated creation of proof-of-concept exploits is a
very complicated matter on its own, we take care to make
the bugs security critical and potentially exploitable by de-
sign, without checking the general satisfiability of exploita-
tion conditions.
We implemented a tool called EvilCoder that demon-
strates the practical feasibility of our bug insertion tech-
niques. To this end, we extended Joern, an open-source
platform for robust C/C++ analysis by Yamaguchi et al. [36],
to facilitate interprocedural analysis and our bug insertion
techniques. In the current prototype, we focus on the gen-
eration of taint-style vulnerabilities [36], which cover many
vulnerability categories such as buffer overflows, integer over-
flows, information leaks, and format string vulnerabilities.
However, we deem generating bug patterns for temporal vul-
nerabilities such as race condition or use-after free vulnera-
bilities to be possible as well.
We evaluate our tool by applying it to four different open-
source projects, where we found between 22 and 158 unique
connected source-sink pairs per project. Since each such pair
can be connected with multiple data flows, each such pair
usually accounts for dozens of potential locations to insert
vulnerabilities. Including our varying source-code modifica-
tions, this could lead to hundreds of test cases for a bug-
finding tool. To justify our claim of generating potentially
exploitable bugs, we re-generated the vulnerability of a non-
trivial exploitable CVEs from the patched version of the
program. We plan to publish our tool and artificially bug-
infested corpora to encourage both the creation of public
benchmarks for future bug-finding research and new models
for automated bug insertion.
In summary, our main contributions in this paper are:
• We present a method to automatically insert security-
critical bugs into complex software systems.
• We implemented a prototype of our techniques called
EvilCoder, which can insert taint-style vulnerabili-
ties using six different classes of instrumentation.
• We empirically demonstrated the capabilities of our
tool by finding between 22 and 158 unique, connected
source-sink pairs in four open-source projects, which
translates to hundreds of potential bugs. Furthermore,
we show that we can automatically re-generate the vul-
nerability in a non-trivial exploitable CVE from the
patched version of the program.
2. APPROACH
In this section, we define our goals and explain the design
and workflow of our approach to automatically add security-
critical bugs to arbitrary applications.
2.1 Purpose and Scope
Ultimately, we want to insert security-critical bugs into
an application. As noted above, we focus on generating test
corpora for bug-finding techniques. Since we do not want
to exclude techniques which rely on source code, we chose
to work on the source code level. Note that this does not
limit binary-based approaches, as the instrumented source
code can be compiled to generate a binary executables for
different processor architectures.
This choice entails the need to choose a programming lan-
guage which we want to support for a prototype implemen-
tation. Because of its widespread use in important software
and its affinity for security-critical bugs, we opted for the C
programming language. However, we think that the general
idea is applicable to other programming languages as well.
2.2 Supported Vulnerability Classes
Naturally, both finding potentially vulnerable source code
locations and instrumenting them to be actually security-
critical, are specific to the class of the vulnerability we want
to cover. We opted to focus on taint-style vulnerabilities [36]
because they account for many different types of vulnerabil-
ities, mainly from the spatial domain. These vulnerabilities
are essentially characterized by an improperly secured data
flow from a user-controlled source to a sensitive sink.
While we think that supporting taint-style vulnerabilities
is sufficient for a prototype, our system can be extended to
support other kinds of vulnerabilities in future work. Espe-
cially temporal vulnerabilities such as security-critical race
conditions or use-after-free vulnerabilities would require ad-
ditional reasoning about the life cycle of resources and ob-
jects, but we are convinced that our approach and imple-
mentation take a large step towards reaching this goal.
Note that the models we use for our supported vulnera-
bility classes are not exhaustive. For example, there will be
instances of buffer overflow vulnerabilities which are not cov-
ered by our model, and which we (as a consequence) cannot
generate. While we do not think that the models could ever
be exhaustive in practice, they can certainly be extended to
cover more cases by extending our current heuristics.
2.3 Supported Instrumentations
Given that taint-style vulnerabilities are defined by im-
properly secured data flows and that we start with an appli-
cation which we assume to be secure1, our task is essentially
to identify and then modify the security mechanisms.
The instrumentation can fall in one of two categories:
1During development, we actually encountered situations
where we could not locate the security mechanism between
source and sink for the simple reason that the code was al-
ready vulnerable.
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Figure 1: Workflow of Automatic Bug Insertion
1. Invalidate security mechanisms: We can inten-
tionally weaken mechanisms, like sanitization or guard
statements, which protect a security sensitive API call.
This could mean to the protection altogether or to
modify a necessary length check to never trigger.
2. Using security anti patterns: We can leverage typ-
ical patterns of vulnerable code. For example, there
are a lot of faulty check patterns that do not actually
prevent and/or detect an integer overflow. One could
also transform printf("%s", buf) to printf(buf) to
introduce a format string vulnerability. Furthermore,
TOCTTOU races [3] could be introduced by altering
open()/access() or stat()/open() constructs.
We prevent syntactically incorrect code by applying our
instrumentations in a conservative manner, meaning that
we do not apply it if the specific instrumentation does not
“understand” every element of the security mechanism at
hand.
2.4 Workflow
Figure 1 shows the individual stages of our system, while
Listing 1 depicts a high-level description of our algorithm
for automatic insertion of security-critical bugs:
1. Preparing the analysis,
2. Enabling interprocedural analysis,
3. Finding potentially vulnerable paths and finally
4. Instrumenting potentially vulnerable paths to become
actually vulnerable.
Listing 1: High-Level Description of our Algorithm for
Automatic Bug Insertion
1 Find a l l s e n s i t i v e s i nk s
2 for ( each found s e n s i t i v e s ink ) :
3 Trace data to user−c o n t r o l l e d source
4 Find con t r o l f l ows from source to s ink
5 for ( each found con t r o l f low ) :
6 Find r e l evan t s e c u r i t y mechanisms in path
7 if ( matches known v u l n e r a b i l i t y c l a s s ) :
8 Find a p p l i c a b l e ins t rumentat ions
9 Use randomly chosen inst rumentat ion
Listing 2: Running Example for Automatic Bug Insertion
1 int r e a d f r o m f i l e (FILE ∗ f ) {
2 int l ength ;
3 f r ead ( ( char ∗)& length , sizeof ( int ) , 1 , f ) ;
4 return l ength ;
5 }
6
7 void wrapper (FILE ∗ f , int ∗ t h e l e n ) {
8 ∗ t h e l e n = r e a d f r o m f i l e ( f ) ;
9 }
10
11 void copy bu f f e r ( FILE ∗ f t r u e , FILE ∗ f f a l s e
12 , char ∗buf , int w h i c h f i l e
13 , int use wrapper ) {
14 int l en ;
15 if ( use wrapper ) {
16 if ( w h i c h f i l e ) wrapper ( f t r u e , &len ) ;
17 else wrapper ( f f a l s e , &len ) ;
18 }
19 else {
20 if ( w h i c h f i l e ) l en = r e a d f r o m f i l e ( f t r u e ) ;
21 else l en = r e a d f r o m f i l e ( f f a l s e ) ;
22 }
23
24 if ( l en > 256) {
25 p r i n t f ( " ERROR : len is too big .\ n" ) ;
26 e x i t ( 1 ) ;
27 }
28
29 char l o c a l [ 2 5 6 ] ;
30 memcpy( l o ca l , buf , l en ) ;
31 memset ( buf , 0 , 512 ) ;
32 do something with ( l o c a l ) ;
33 }
Throughout this section, we will use the running example
depicted in Listing 2 to explain the individual steps. Es-
sentially, the shown program reads a length field from a file
(line 3) and uses it to copy up to 256 bytes of data from
one buffer into another (line 30). Furthermore, it also in-
validates the original buffer (line 31) by calling memset().
For illustrative purposes, the function copy_buffer() has
switches to read from two different files and optionally use a
wrapper function for doing so. While the function perform-
ing the reading returns the read value, the wrapper function
modifies its argument to show another type of data transfer.
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Figure 2: Topological sort of the functions in Listing 2
2.4.1 Preparing Analysis
Starting with the source code of the application, we first
invoke the preprocessor to handle preprocessor directives,
which results in pure C source code. In the next step,
we compute the code property graph [36] from the source
code. Essentially, this means to use robust, island-grammar-
based [27] parsing to put the source code into a graph database,
which represents the abstract syntax tree (AST), types, con-
trol flow and data flow as nodes and edges. All further anal-
ysis happens solely on this graph database and we only turn
to the source code files for later instrumentation.
2.4.2 Enabling Interprocedural Data Flow Analysis
The reference implementation of code property graphs
does not support interprocedural analysis out of the box.
This means for example that if a subfunction changes one of
its parameters, this is not reflected in the data-flow graph of
the calling function, where the argument to the subfunction
should be marked as modified.
To rectify this, we first compute the call graph of the appli-
cation. To establish which parameters a function modifies,
it is necessary to know which subfunctions modify their pa-
rameters. Thus, we use a topological sorting of the graph
to analyze subfunctions first. Figure 2 shows the exemplary
topological sort for the running example from Listing 2. In
this figure, all edges are left-facing, meaning that analyzing
the functions from left to right is a valid sequence. Once we
know which parameters a subfunction modifies, the data-
flow graph in the calling function can be adjusted accord-
ingly. Note that static analysis does not always allow to
precisely compute if parameters are modified or not, which
is why we allow a “maybe” state at this point.
In the running example, copy_buffer() has to be aug-
mented, because memset(), memcpy() and wrapper() each
modify one of their arguments. Furthermore, every function
calling copy_buffer() would have to be modified as well,
because it sets the value of buf.
In case of circular dependencies in the call graph, we follow
a best-effort approach to break the circle by picking a func-
tion which has the least number of calls. We expect most
of those cases to stem from simple recursive functions (i. e.,
the circle has only two identical elements and it is irrelevant,
which is analyzed first).
Naturally, we can only analyze code that is available, but
especially code from external libraries may not always be
present for analysis. Thus, we incorporate means to read
their parameter modification status from a provided file. We
handle the standard C library glibc in this way, as it is
linked into virtually all C programs.
2.4.3 Finding Potentially Vulnerable Locations
Now that we have set up the source code for interproce-
dural analysis, recall that a taint-style vulnerability is de-
fined by an insufficiently secured data flow between a user-
controlled source and a sensitive sink. Thus, to insert a
vulnerability, we start by finding all sensitive sinks in the
application. For us, a sensitive sink is a certain parameter
of a given security-critical function, like the length field of a
memcpy() in line 30 of Listing 2. Naturally, this depends on
the type of vulnerability: for buffer overflows, this could be
memcpy(), while for information leaks it could be printf().
To some extent, also functions like malloc() are sensitive,
as a user-controlled source deciding on the number of bytes
to allocate could easily lead to a denial of service attack or
maybe even cause more harm.
Next, we try to trace the data sources of a sensitive sink
to a user-controlled source. We currently define files, net-
work connections, command-line arguments, standard in-
put streams (stdin) and environment variables to be user-
controlled. Contrary to the sinks, the user-controlled sources
are not specific to the vulnerability, but to the application.
Our choice should cover most user-land use cases, but espe-
cially for kernels, where every piece of data from user-land
has to be regarded as potentially malicious, other functions
have to be added, such as copy_from_user() or get_user().
For now, we do not account for database interfaces, as the
types of interfaces are simply too diverse in practice. Note
that in contrast to bug finding, it is not necessary for bug in-
sertion to cover all possibilities, because a missed path does
not result in a vulnerability being undetected, but only in
one less opportunity for an inserted bug.
In the running example, possible data sources for the
length value in the memcpy() are in lines 16/17 (set by wrap-
per()), as well as in lines 20/21 (set by read_from_file()).
In the third and fourth case, the value is set as the return
value (line 4) of read_from_file(). This return value car-
ries the name length at this point. In turn, the value length
is set in line 3 as the first argument of fread(), which
is a user-controlled source. Retracing the data source for
each step, we have now found a data flow between a user-
controlled source and a sensitive sink. For the first and sec-
ond case, we have to trace the value len to the parameter of
wrapper(), where it is renamed to the_len (line 7). Apart
from the different variable names, the same transitions as in
third and fourth case happen from this point on.
Once we found a data connection between a user-controlled
source and a sensitive sink, we enumerate all the control
flows spanned by this data flow. This is an important dis-
tinction, since the data flow does not include statements
which do not modify the variables in question, but are nev-
ertheless executed on the path. Next, we have to find the
security mechanisms in each control-flow path. Each transi-
tion in a data flow is caused by a variable transferring data.
Thus, an edge between two data-flow nodes can be labeled
with that variable. Naturally, this label also overarches the
control flow between the two data-flow nodes. To find secu-
rity mechanisms, we now follow the uses of the overarching
variable in the specific control-flow range. Essentially, when
these variables occur in the constraint of an if statement,
we assume it to be a guard statement. Sanitizations on the
other hand depend on the respective types of source and
sink, which is why specialized methods would be necessary
to recognize them [21].
Regarding the running example, consider the data flow for
reading the first file without using a wrapper function (line
20). The control flow between the memcpy() and the call to
read_from_file traverses line 29 and (potentially) the lines
27-24 as well—even though in practice, only line 24 will be
traversed, since the execution would be aborted in line 26.
Next, line 20 is traversed, which includes a call. However,
since the value stems from a return statement, one has to
retrace the function from the end, starting at line 4 and
ending in line 3. Thus, the control flow for this source-sink
pair consists of the lines (3, 4, 20, 24, 29). Of those, only line
24 holds a check and since it is overarched by the variable
in question (len), it is considered a security mechanism.
2.4.4 Instrumenting
Once the potentially vulnerable control flow and supported
security mechanisms are found, we have to transform the un-
derlying source code such that it is actually vulnerable. We
start with a more careful analysis of the mechanism at hand
and its surroundings, to enumerate the number of possible
instrumentations for disabling this specific security mecha-
nism. For example, for a guard statement, we have to find
out whether is supposed to be triggered or not. At this
point, we use heuristics depending on the presence of re-
turn or exit statements, setting of warning or error values,
or signals and exceptions. This way, we can conservatively
remove security checks, which would abort the execution
anyways. Thus the program should run just as before on
benign inputs. However, the program will not reject a mal-
formed input anymore, but propagate it to the sensitive sink.
Once the set of applicable instrumentations is established,
our prototype picks one at random. Using the source code
location information from the graph database, we can now
apply the source code transformation on the source code.
In our running example, we could modify line 24 to read
if(wrapper == 0xDEADC0DE && len > 256) {, which would
mean that the constraint never evaluates to true, which in
turn allows values larger than 256 to be passed to the mem-
cpy(). This would result in a stack buffer overflow, which in
turn means that we have inserted a bug that is most likely
exploitable.
The high-level description of our algorithm does not ac-
count for two optimizations: First, once it is known whether
a traversed subpath for a specific variable ends in a user-
controlled source or not, one can cache this result to prevent
traversing this subpath again. Second, to insert another bug,
one can reuse a found user-controlled source, the sensitive
sink and data-flow paths between them, while choosing an-
other control-flow path and another instrumentation.
One important metric for our tool would be the number
of potentially vulnerable paths it can find. However, our
running example in Listing 2 was chosen to show that the
number of such paths can be quite misleading. In the exam-
ple, we connect the same sink (memcpy(), line 30) to the
same source (fread(), line 3) in two different ways: once
through wrapper() and once through read_from_file() di-
rectly. However, since we can do so in two different places,
one would have to count this as four different data flows,
even though only two of them perform different steps. One
can see that each intermediary node in a data flow could
potentiate the number of possible paths. The same is true
for the control flow in between as well. Thus, while we re-
port the number of paths our tool can find in the experiment
in Section 4.2, we consider the number of unique connected
source-sink pairs to be less meaningful. Furthermore, the
number of bugs we can insert depends on the number of po-
tentially vulnerable paths. But even if we could count them,
the number of potential instrumentations cannot be esti-
mated in a meaningful way. In the example from above, any
expression, which evaluates to false could be used. Given
that there is a sheer infinite number of syntactic ways to do
that using different variables, magic constants or arithmetic
operations, we refrain from giving a number at this point.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we further deepen the concepts introduced
in the previous section by explaining implementation-specific
details of our prototype EvilCoder, which we implemented
using Java on a machine running Debian 8 “Jessie”.
3.1 JOERN and Graph Database
Joern [36] is the central component of our prototype, thus
we begin by explaining its role in our workflow. It uses island
grammars [27] to parse C code (and to some extent C++
code) in a robust manner, meaning that it can for exam-
ple handle missing headers and non-compiling code. Natu-
rally, further analysis is hindered in such situations, but the
framework will usually succeed to create meaningful output
for such partially defined code. The resulting code property
graphs, which encode the AST, control-flow and data-flow
information in annotated nodes and edges, is written into
the graph database Neo4J [28].
3.2 Functions Changing Their Parameters
As already mentioned, Joern does not take interproce-
dural data flows into account. We rectify this in two steps:
first, for each function, we analyze which of its parameters it
sets. Then, we augment a function’s data flow to take into
account which of its subfunctions modify their arguments.
We modified ArgumentTainter, a tool shipped with Joern,
to allow batch processing functions. In the terminology of
the tool, a tainted argument is one which gets modified.
As mentioned above, subfunctions have to be analyzed
before the function calling them. This requires us to find
function pointers and estimate their possible values. While
the former can be implemented efficiently, determining their
possible values at each callsite is a hard task in itself. To
be on the safe side, we consider all functions, which could
be assigned anywhere in the program, to be possible values
at that callsite. In essence, we use the same algorithms to
trace the data sources of function pointers that we use for
the remaining analysis. However, since a complete data-flow
graph is not available yet, we walk along the control-flow
graph and check for uses of function names and, naturally,
we stop at function-uses instead of user-controlled sources.
Note that the database still does not have data-flow edges
from one function to another. To cross function boundaries
for interprocedural analysis, the algorithm we discuss in Sec-
tion 3.4 is necessary.
3.3 Preprocessing
Since we focus on vulnerabilities in C code, we do not
want our analysis to be hindered by preprocessor directives,
which could disrupt the C language semantics, e. g., with
conditional compilation.
Thus, we execute the preprocessor on the source code files
before parsing them with Joern. Given that there is a com-
piler flag to do this, this seems like a trivial step. One might
overlook, however, that this requires building the applica-
tion, which in turn may require a non-trivial build configu-
ration. To solve this problem, we take a pragmatic approach:
we build the program using the provided configuration, using
the --dry-run option of make, and record the used compiler
invocations. Then, we modify the would-be executed com-
mand lines to invoke the preprocessor instead of actually
compiling or linking.
3.4 Finding Potentially Vulnerable Source
Code Locations
We start by finding all user-controlled sources and sensi-
tive sinks. Given that we opted to search our way backwards
from a sink to a source, it would be sufficient to find just the
sinks to start our search. However, having the sources pre-
determined as well allows us to decide quickly whether we
reached user-controlled data or not in later phases—simply
because we already made that decision upfront.
The algorithm we use to trace data-flow information is
depicted in Listing 3. In essence, this algorithm gets a sen-
sitive sink as input and puts it into a queue. Then, for
each node in the queue, it computes the source for that
specific node and saves it in a tree-like structure. Once it
finds a node to be user-controlled, it can traverse this def-
inition tree back to the root to construct a data-flow path
from a user-controlled source to a sensitive sink. Of course,
the actual algorithm has to be more careful to handle all the
edge-cases and to provide fallbacks, should Joern have mal-
formed output. Furthermore, it tracks the variable names of
every traversed data source. Obviously, the variable names
can change when one variable is assigned to another. How-
ever, they also change in the context of interprocedural anal-
ysis. This happens when a variable is passed as an argument
to a subfunction. In this case, it assumes the name of the
parameter in that subfunction. This is true in reverse, too,
so that when tracking the data sources of a parameter, the
variable assumes each name of the matching argument at
each callsite. However, it also happens, when a variable is
returned, in which case the name of the returned variable
becomes the name of the assigned variable and vice versa.
Contrary to the algorithm in Listing 3, our implementa-
tion allows to find more than one user-controlled source. It
performs a breadth-first search for the data sources of a cer-
tain node, using a queue to save nodes reached through data
flows from the start node. Then, it subsequently pops the
first node from the queue and adds nodes to the end of the
queue, which are reached by the popped node.
However, the possible complexity of C expressions makes
deciding which variables influences the current value, either
by modification or by full assignment, non-trivial. This de-
cision is even more complex for interprocedural analysis. Es-
sentially, we distinguish five cases, which correspond to the
steps 1.3.1 to 1.3.5 in the algorithm:
1. Increment/Decrement:
E. g., ++a; or (my_struct.member_1)--;
2. Left-hand-side of arithmetic expression:
E. g., a = b + (c * 2); ⇒ b, c
3. Assigned as return-value of function-call:
E. g., given c = f(a, b); and int f(int x, int y)
{int r = x+y; return r;}, one has to continue at r,
when looking for the data sources of c.
4. Assigned as argument in function-call:
E. g., for strcpy(dst, src);, the data source for dst
is src. For functions given in the source code, we can
trace the data flow from assignments to the param-
eter in question, which will then end up in another
parameter. For external functions, however, we use a
precomputed “data-transfer” lookup-table.
5. Assigned as parameter of a function:
When tracing the data source for the local variable a
in void f(int x) {a = x;}, the data flow for a ends
at the parameter x. Thus, we find all callsites of f,
e. g., f(y), and continue retracing the data flow at y.
While we try our best to detect assignment-by-alias, we
can obviously only do so to a limited extent, as pointer alias-
ing is known to be a hard problem [13]. Certainly, there ex-
ist modern approaches, which are both reasonably accurate
and fast [17,18], but we deem our best-effort approach to be
sufficient to introduce and demonstrate the concept.
As mention in Section 2, we consider files, network, com-
mand-line arguments, the standard input stream, and envi-
ronment variables to be user-controlled. Therefore, we mark
the respective arguments of the libc functions responsible
for these tasks as user-controlled sources.
Concerning the sensitive sinks, we focussed on spatial
memory errors as performed by the usual suspects like, e. g.
memcpy(), strncpy() or snprintf(). However, for informa-
tion leaks, we could also consider functions which transfer
data out of the application (e.g., fwrite(), printf(), or
send()) as sensitive. Similarly, functions like malloc() are
considered sensitive, as controlling their input could lead to
denial of service and more severe attacks.
3.5 Finding Control Flows
Now that we have found a data flow between a user-
controlled source and a sensitive sink, we want to find the
control flow connecting the data flow nodes. Recall that we
may have crossed function borders in the course of our anal-
ysis. Since a function can only be entered at its entry point
and left through an exit point2, like a return statement or
the function end, our search for the control flow has to take
care to respect this property of functions. To this end, our
search has to be aware of the functions holding the current
pair of data-flow nodes, and which function calls the other.
In practice, we actually want to find all control flows be-
tween two nodes in the found data flow, instead of just one.
However, this can be done node-wise for each node in the
data-flow graph, to a data structure like the one in Figure 3.
Note that the control flow between the user-controlled
source and the sensitive sink may not stretch to the pro-
gram’s entry point, i. e., it may not cover all the instructions,
which have to be executed to later exploit the application.
3.6 Finding Security Mechanisms
Having collected the possible control flows between the
user-controlled source and the sensitive sink, we can find
the security mechanisms the application uses to secure this
data flow. Since the data is defined by the user-controlled
source, previous code cannot help to do so, just as no code
2Technically, with constructs like setjmp/longjmp or inline
assembly, one can violate this property. However, they ba-
sically annul the high-level semantics of the language.
Listing 3: High-Level Algorithm for Tracing Data-Sources
Input : s e n s i t i v e s ink
Output : Data−f low path from s e n s i t i v e s ink to user−c o n t r o l l e d source
0 . queue = s e n s i t i v e s ink
1 . while ( ! queue . i s empty ( ) ) :
1 . 1 node , var = queue . pop ( )
1 .2 if ( node . i s u s e r c o n t r o l l e d ( ) ) :
1 . 2 . 1 return b a c k t r a c e d e f i n i t i o n t r e e o f n o d e t i l l s i n k ( d e f t r e e , node )
1 .3 switch ( a s s i g n e d a s ) :
1 . 3 . 1 case Increment /Decrement :
da ta sour c e s = s e l f
1 . 3 . 2 case Left−hand−s i d e o f a r i thmet i c expr e s s i on :
da ta sour c e s = data source s o f r ight−hand−s i d e
1 . 3 . 3 case Assigned as return−value o f funct ion−c a l l :
da ta sour c e s = return statements o f c a l l e d func t i on
1 . 3 . 4 case Assigned as argument in funct ion−c a l l :
da ta sour c e s = data source s o f ass ignments to parameter o f c a l l e d func t i on
1 . 3 . 5 case Assigned as parameter o f a func t i on :
da ta sour c e s = data source s o f argument at c a l l s i t e s o f func t i on
1 .4 d e f i n i t i o n t r e e [ node ] += data sour c e s
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Figure 3: Control flow between data-flow nodes
after the sensitive sink can, because the potentially harmful
instruction will already have been executed. Note that this
assumption may not hold in face of parallel execution or
precautions taken by the operating system.
We divide security mechanisms into security checks and
sanitizations. For our purposes, a security check has the
following properties:
1. It occurs in the control flow between user-controlled
source and sensitive sink.
2. It uses data derived from the sensitive data ending up
in the sensitive sink.
3. Its result influences the control flow to stop this data
flow to the sensitive sink.
This captures both direct and indirect examples:
f r ead ( ( void ∗)& len , 4 , 1 , f i l e ) ;
if ( l en < 256) memcpy( dst , src , l en ) ;
bool i s t o o l a r g e = s t r l e n ( argv [ 1 ] ) >= 256 ;
if ( i s t o o l a r g e ) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
To find security checks, we simply follow the path between
source and sink, while tracing which data is influenced by the
sensitive data. Then, we use this information to determine
if it causes a control-flow divergence.
For sanitization, the constructs to search for are highly
specific for the sensitive sink: data which ends in a shell-
command (e.g., system() has to be sanitized in a different
way than data for an SQL query. One cannot, however,
assume in general that every change to the data is actu-
ally a sanitization. As of now, our prototype does recognize
some sanitizations, like inserting 0x00-bytes into strings to
restrict their length, but our instrumentations do not cover
manipulating such sanitizations, yet.
3.7 Instrumentations
The instrumentations, i.e., our code transformations that
actually disable security mechanisms, happen in three steps:
1. Bugdoorability: Decide, if our models “understand”
the security mechanism.
2. Applicable instrumentations: Enumerate the pos-
sible instrumentations for this security mechanism.
3. Apply random instrumentation: Choose a possi-
ble instrumentation at random and apply it.
The first and second steps are somewhat intermingled and
rather straightforward, as we simply compare the type of
mechanisms a specific instrumentation can disable against
the security mechanism. For our prototype, we mainly fo-
cus on disabling security checks, which means constructs like
if(length > 256) {. . .} and thus implemented the follow-
ing instrumentations classes:
• Remove security mechanism
• Surround by if with constraints always evaluating to
false (resp. true), to never (resp. always) execute
• Arithmetically influence decision logic
• Move security mechanism into an unrelated path
• Swap the security mechanism and sensitive sink
• Use security anti-patterns for integer overflow checks
Note that an instrumentation class can cover many in-
strumentations. For example, we can transform a statement
such as (length > 256) to different representations:
• (length > 512)
• (length/2 > 256)
• (length > 256*2)
• ((char)length > 256)
Thus, we do not think that there is a fair way to count
the number of actual instrumentations to introduce a bug,
as instrumentation subclasses could be defined almost arbi-
trarily and syntactic changes introduced by an instrumen-
tation class are virtually unlimited. Thus, we refrain from
reporting the number of possible instrumentations during
the evaluation of our prototype.
4. EVALUATION
In the following, we evaluate our prototype for automatic
bug insertion called EvilCoder with respect to its perfor-
Table 1: Results of automatic bug insertion
libpng vsftpd wget busybox
Lines of code 40,044 20,046 137,234 265,887
User-controlled sources (UCS) 9 3 21 152
Sensitive sinks (Si) 98 13 453 573
Unique UCS-Si combinations 158 22 22 30
UCS-to-Si data-flow paths 22,516 786 1,882 2,905
mance, the quantity of security-critical bugs it can intro-
duce, and the exploitability of said introduced bugs.
To this end, we tried to introduce vulnerabilities into
open-source projects, namely libpng, wget, busybox, and
vsftpd. We found between 22 and 158 unique source-sink
pairs for each tested project, which translates to hundreds of
security-critical data paths. This in turn implies hundreds of
different security-critical bug variations we could introduce.
Our rationale regarding the exploitability is as follows: By
definition, the vulnerabilities we study have a data flow from
a user-controlled source to a sensitive sink. If only insuffi-
cient security mechanisms are found on this data-flow path,
we have a taint-style vulnerability. Assuming that the path
was not vulnerable to begin with, the security mechanisms
on the path are the reason as to why the path is not vul-
nerable. Consequently, this means that relaxing the security
mechanisms makes the path vulnerable.
Naturally, the sheer volume of generated bugs, combined
with the lack of practical automatic exploit generation, means
that we cannot verify that every single introduced bug is ac-
tually exploitable. However, we chose to justify our claim
of introducing exploitable bugs by taking a patched ap-
plication, which had real-world exploitable CVEs, and re-
introducing a security-critical bug into the path in question.
4.1 Setup
All experiments were conducted in a virtual Debian 8
“Jessie” machine, with an Intel Core i7-2640M @ 2.8GHz,
8GB DDR3-RAM @ 1600MHz and an SSD.
4.2 Bugdooring Open-Source Projects
For this experiment, we tried to insert bugs into four open-
source projects. We chose libpng, the official reference li-
brary for the popular image format PNG, because it suffered
from a well-studied CVE which we wanted to use as a case
study in a following experiment (see Section 4.4). Further-
more, we chose the two popular standalone programs wget
v1.16 and busybox v1.24.1. The FTP server vsftpd was
implemented with security in mind, which is why it performs
all buffer-related operations through a set of wrapper func-
tions to shield the actual application code from the sanity
checks necessary to prevent buffer overflows or overreads.
As one can see in Table 1, our tool is able to find a sub-
stantial number of sensitive data paths for each application.
The library libpng has a lot of such paths compared to its
code size, which was expected since the PNG file format in-
corporates several context sensitive length fields. For this
library, the number of user-controlled sources is rather low,
since most data flow actually traces back to one of a few
file reading operations. Compared to that, the number of
user-controlled sources in wget and busybox is rather high,
given that they exchange data not only via files. Considering
that we mostly searched for user-controlled length fields, the
number of found potentially vulnerable paths was expected.
As mentioned before, vsftpd performs all buffer-related op-
erations through a set of wrapper functions. Indeed, the
Table 2: Runtime in minutes:seconds for different phases of
processing open-source projects
Runtime for phase libpng vsftpd wget busybox
Importing with Joern
00:32 00:24 00:58 03:49
Analyzing intraprocedural behaviour
00:35 00:12 01:33 03:42
Augmenting code property graph for interprocedural analysis
01:18 00:22 03:40 35:28
Finding UCS-to-Si paths
01:56 00:49 02:14 7:05
Total: 04:21 01:47 08:25 50:04
...per 10,000 LOC: 01:05 00:53 00:37 01:56
number of both user-controlled sources and sensitive sinks
is very low, and all the potentially vulnerable paths our cur-
rent implementation found traverse the security checks of
these wrapper functions.
The value for unique user-controlled source (UCS) and
sensitive sink (Si) combinations refers to the number of user-
controlled source for which we found data-flow from a single
sensitive sink, summed over all sensitive sinks:∑
s∈Si
#{u ∈ UCS, where s connects to u}
In contrast, the number of UCS-to-Si data-flow paths refers
to the sum over all data-flow paths that connect the found
user-controlled sources and sensitive sinks. Since Joern
sometimes includes transitive data-flow edges, the reported
numbers may be higher than the data flows occurring when
executing the program. Thus, they can be seen as an upper
bound, while the unique UCS-Si combinations can serve as
a lower bound, which means that the actual number of data
flows can be estimated to be between those two. Since the
number of control-flow nodes connecting to data-flow nodes
suffers from the same problem, we do not report them here.
As mentioned before, there is no fair way to estimate the
number of applicable instrumentations for a given UCS-to-
Si path, but given that multiple instrumentation classes are
applicable to each found path, it is safe to say that we can
introduce at least a hundred bugs into each tested project.
4.3 Performance
Table 2 shows that transforming the source code into code
property graphs using Joern is fast, although it does not
behave linearly in the size of code base. The next step (i.e.,
analyzing which functions set which parameters) is slower,
but seems to increase linearly with the size of the code base.
Naturally, some functions take longer to analyze than others,
depending on the number of their parameters, the number
of subfunctions they invoke and their general size, but we
observed this to average out over the full code base. The
time for augmenting the code property graph to facilitate
interprocedural analysis, as expected, grows for larger code
bases, but the size of the code base is not the only relevant
factor: we observed that intertwined programs, where a lot
of function are called in a lot of places, result in increased
runtime. Similarly, the time for finding potentially vulnera-
ble paths depends not only on the size of the code base, but
especially on the fan-out of potential continuations of the
data flow. Function pointers in particular are problematic
in this context. Since a specific data-flow path only has to
be traversed once per variable to know whether it ends up
in a user-controlled source, tracing the data flow for a spe-
cific sensitive sink tends to get faster towards the end of the
algorithm when more nodes have already been visited.
Given the nature of C code, transforming it into property
graphs is most likely best performed in one step. Intrapro-
cedural analysis to facilitate the augmentation of the code
property graphs for interprocedural analysis, however, could
be performed in an ad-hoc fashion, depending on the neces-
sities of the source-to-sink data-flow analysis. This would
allow us to analyze a smaller subset of the program and
increase performance.
4.4 Case Study: Libpng CVE-2004-0597
Libpng had multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities de-
scribed in CVE-2004-0597. Here, we will discuss the auto-
matic removal of the introduced security guards. We chose
this example for two reasons: First, it is well studied, as its
exploitation is a training example in an undergrad course [23].
Second, it highlights some of our tool’s features, namely in-
terprocedural analysis, function pointers, data-flow through
struct members, and removal of multiple guards.
In particular this CVE describes a stack buffer overflow
due to a malformed palette-index. A stack buffer of fixed
size (256 bytes) is allocated to hold a color palette index.
However, the length of the palette is read from a png file and
libpng only checked whether this value exceeded the size of
the main color palette. This did not prohibit the attacker
from claiming an index palette size of more than 256 bytes
in the png file, which lead to a stack buffer overflow. Thus,
a patch was issued to additionally check, whether the length
exceeded 256 bytes, the maximum size for an index palette.
4.4.1 Sensitive Sink and User-Controlled Source
The length for the palette-index is passed through four
functions in three different files, until the buffer is filled at
the sensitive sink: a call to fread(). Since fread() is user-
controlled, the attacker controls the stackbuffer’s contents,
which makes this vulnerability likely to be exploitable.
The way to the user-controlled source for the length-field
is a little more complex. Over the course of ten functions
in five files, it changed its name eight times and its type
once. One had to track data flow through three different
struct members, the data was copied, passed as parameters,
returned and filled via memcpy() from an internal buffer,
which in turn was finally set via fread().
4.4.2 Instrumentations
There are 22 nodes in the data-flow path from the user-
controlled source to the sensitive sink, but the shortest of
the 144 connecting control-flows is already 114 nodes long
and includes 37 checks. Only five of those are overarched
by the respective variable connecting two nodes in the data
flow. Three of them check internal relations between buffer
sizes and another one checks for an out-of-range integer. The
final one is the check which was issued with the patch.
The conditions of the first three checks have to be ful-
filled to continue execution, but their alternative path does
not immediately abort the program and thus our approach
deems them not to be security critical. The out-of-range
check, however, would abort execution, which is why our ap-
proach would instrument it to never evaluate to true. While
this introduces a bug, it does not hinder execution on well-
formed input. As for the last check, our tool automatically
determines that it must never evaluate to true and can de-
termine which of our instrumentation classes apply. Then,
it applies one of those instrumentations and thereby intro-
duces a bug. Because we know that an exploit for the pro-
gram lacking this very check exists, we can conclude that
our tool successfully inserted an exploitable vulnerability.
General Obstacles.
We found that libpng uses the C preprocessor directive
#define png_memcpy memcpy and only uses png_memcpy()
throughout its code. We found this pattern of using macros
for simple wrapper functionality to occur frequently. Since
this alias does not stem from C code, it cannot be detected
with C-analysis alone. Thus, source code analysis for C
either has to be aware of preprocessor macros or utilize the
preprocessor, like we do.
5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We now discuss limitations of our approach and current
prototype, possible future work, and alternative use cases of
automated bug insertion.
5.1 Exploitability
Our technique finds path between user-controlled sources
and sensitive sinks, and then modifies or removes security
mechanisms on these paths, thus creating security-relevant
bugs. However, this may not be enough to actually create
an exploitable vulnerability, as we cannot assert the global
satisfiability of all path conditions, which are necessary to
traverse the path in question.
One observation argues in favour of possible exploitation
despite all this: the security mechanisms are present in the
program. If no values existed for traversing the path in ques-
tion, the security mechanism would be superfluous in the
first place. Note that this assumes that no overly defensive
programming strategy was used.
While research towards automatic generation of exploits [2,
4] or at least some proof of seriousness of the bug [19] ex-
ists, verifying all generated bugs with such complicated ad-
ditional components seemed unreasonable. As mentioned
in Section 4.4, we tried to justify our claim of exploitabil-
ity by letting our tool reintroduce known-to-be-exploitable
bugs. Nevertheless, automatic satisfiability verification and
exploit generation are out of scope for this paper.
Unfortunately, the lack of confirmed vulnerabilities in com-
bination with the impossibility to count the number of in-
troduced bugs in a meaningful way means that it is not
possible to report something like a false positive rate for our
approach.
5.2 Additional Vulnerabilities
The bugs we introduce are limited in two ways: first, we
only support a limited number of vulnerability types, which
all belong to the class of taint-style vulnerabilities, as they
allow rather conventional exploitation. Thus, we cannot in-
troduce other types of bugs for now. However, we believe
implementing additional bug classes to be straightforward.
Second, while we do add some element of randomness to
the introduction of bugs, they undoubtedly have a pattern.
For the use-case of an artificial bug corpus, this might ar-
guably be problematic, as it would be a very valid strategy
to model the heuristics we used to introduce the bugs to
find them later on. However, given that we can automati-
cally introduce such bugs, it can also be argued that finding
these bugs, whether they have a pattern or not, is abso-
lutely mandatory. Hence, we create some kind of baseline
to evaluate techniques that aim to detect vulnerabilities in
an automated manner.
Furthermore, inserting additional vulnerable paths or func-
tions, instead of only weakening present security mecha-
nisms, would also be interesting for future work.
5.3 Alternative Use Cases
We focused on the generation of test corpora in this paper,
but we do see other use cases for bug insertion. Capture-the-
flag (CTF) contests essentially pose exploiting challenges,
for which vulnerable programs are a necessity. While our
approach does not guarantee exploitability and is not (yet)
targeted towards vulnerabilities which are tricky to exploit,
we think that it could be a valuable tool for the organizers.
Furthermore, the ability to insert exploitable bugs could
theoretically be used to facilitate later exploitation. How-
ever, in this scenario, the attacker would require write access
to the source code. While a recent publication [5] shows that
tampering with version control systems is feasible, it is a big
obstacle. Furthermore, the inserted vulnerability should be
hard to find and exploitable for a long time, i. e., not be
removed soon. Given that we want to insert many vulnera-
bilities instead of a single, special one, we think that manual
effort would be the way to go for an attacker, and thus do
not see an ethical problem with our approach.
6. RELATED WORK
The work most closest to our approach is a recently pub-
lished paper entitled LAVA: Large-scale Automated Vulner-
ability Addition [9]. The authors want to generate a suf-
ficient number of bugs for purposes of testing bug-finding
tools. In contrast to our approach, they chose a dynamic
method by tainting input bytes and tracing them through
the program. They look specifically for rarely modified and
dead data, for which they then insert code performing either
a buffer overread or buffer overflow. If necessary, they intro-
duce new static or global variables to allow the needed data
flow. Additionally, they insert guards to execute the vul-
nerability only if a magic value occurs in the input. As the
name suggests, one could say that they actually add new
vulnerabilities, while we transform code from invulnerable
to vulnerable, i. e., insert bugs. We have chosen a different
methodology, so that we deem this to be concurrent and
independent work.
Given the dynamic approach, LAVA also generates inputs
triggering the vulnerabilities and the authors also provide
preliminary results showing that state-of-the-art fuzzers and
symbolic execution engines are not able to find all the bugs
they are able to add. We think that this finding underlines
the importance of automated bug insertion.
6.1 Insufficient Test Data
Miller [26] uses a set of 16 hand-written vulnerabilities to
compare eight fuzzers and states that, while the scarcity of
test cases is a problem, these 16 artificial test cases already
offered a lot of insight.
Nilson et al. [29] state that “existing sources of vulnerabil-
ity data did not supply the necessary structure or metadata
to evaluate them completely”, which is why they developed
BugBox, a simulation environment with an accompanying
corpus of vulnerabilities and exploits. Their vulnerabili-
ties are real-world examples specific to PHP, and they focus
mostly on the aspects of exploiting.
Delaitre et al. [7] evaluated 14 static analyzers. They
establish three critical characteristics for vulnerability test
cases and state that “Test cases with all three attributes are
out of reach”:
1. Statistical significance: There must be many, di-
verse vulnerabilities.
2. Ground truth: The location of the vulnerabilities
must be known.
3. Relevance: The vulnerabilities must be representa-
tive for those found in real source code.
Test corpora generated with our approach fulfill the first two
characteristics, and we are certain that the third character-
istic can be fulfilled with carefully stated bug models as well,
given that the instrumented code stems from real programs.
6.2 Vulnerability Databases
According to Nilson et al. [29] and Delaitre et al. [7],
the existing databases are not sufficient for a comprehen-
sive evaluation of bug finding techniques. However, that is
not to say that there are no such databases.
First of all, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) and the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
are to mention. The former consists of a short description
of real-world vulnerabilities and links to further resources
regarding the specific vulnerability. Its main purpose is to
identify a certain vulnerability unambiguously, but it does
usually not include actual vulnerable code. The latter of-
ten offers a few code snippets to illustrate the hierarchized
vulnerabilities, but those are likely not sufficient for a com-
prehensive evaluation of bug finding techniques.
Specific to web development, OWASP WebGoat [31] as
well as SecuriBench [20] collect vulnerabilities for illustrative
purposes. However, they do not offer a structured corpus,
which is necessary for evaluation purposes.
The most useful public database for the evaluation of bug
finding techniques is generated by the NIST project Software
Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) [30].
Its largest standalone test suite actually contains over 60,000
vulnerable synthetic test cases, but was uploaded in 2013.
Naturally, these test suites are static and cannot gener-
ate fresh bugs. The project also included the IARPA pro-
gram Securely Taking on Software of Uncertain Provenance
(STONESOUP) [14], which provides 164 Java and C snip-
pets, which can be inserted into other programs to make
them vulnerable. However, the snippets are static and re-
quire rather specific environments.
6.3 Mutation Testing
Mutation testing [16] randomly modifies the source code
to make it behave slightly differently at runtime. In that
way, both the ability of the test set to catch such errors as
well as the necessity and import of the modified piece of code
can be estimated. As a result, both coverage and overlap of
modified code and test set are the important metrics. While,
in principle, bugs like the ones introduced by our approach
could be inserted by mutation testing as well, we purpose-
fully insert special bugs at carefully selected locations to
introduce vulnerabilities.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an approach for automatic
generation of bug-ridden test corpora. Our prototype im-
plementation of this concept currently targets the insertion
of spatial memory errors by modifying security checks using
six different instrumentation classes. With such test cor-
pora, we aim to facilitate future research in the field of bug
finding techniques, so that they can be evaluated and com-
pared in an objective and statistically meaningful way.
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